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Abstract
This paper investigates the discrepancy between the vast natural resource wealth 
and the relatively low spending on human development in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region. Our results show a robust, significant inverse relationship between natural re-
source dependence and public health spending, and natural resource dependence and public 
education spending over time. The effects remain significant after controlling for income, aid, 
the age structure of the population, and the quality of institutions. Moreover, we find a par-
ticularly strong resource curse effect of oil on social spending. Despite the mounting burden on 
MENA‘s economic development models due to significant population growth and the pressing 
need for diversification, countries have been unable or unwilling to convert natural resource 
wealth into increased social spending. Governments should be strongly encouraged to manage 
their natural wealth in an accountable and equitable manner that follows international best 
practice. Correct taxation of natural resource, and especially, oil wealth should provide the gov-
ernments with adequate budgets to fund a desirable level of public health provision. Finally, the 
equity of distribution of education spending could be improved. 
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1. Introduction
While representing only 7.5 per cent of the world’s population (World Bank, 2013), 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region holds 48 and 52 per cent of world oil and gas 
reserves respectively (BP, 2014). Moreover, several countries have abundant mineral wealth. As 
such, the region represents one of the most affluent parts of the world. 
Figure I  : Oil and gas reserves in MENA
Source : BP (2014)
However, though the Human Development Index (HDI) shows that development 
levels are relatively high in resource-rich MENA countries, Table I illustrates that most MENA 
resource-rich countries have large negative values for GDP per capita rank minus HDI rank which 
seems to suggest that these countries have failed to translate their natural-resource fueled eco-
nomic prosperity into improved standards of living. Comparable observations have been made 
by other authors as e.g. Aoun (2013).
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Akkari (2004) similarly points to a negative difference between income and the 
Oxfam Educational Performance Index ranking for several resource-rich Middle Eastern coun-
tries, again leading to the conclusion that resource wealth wasn’t converted into extended op-
portunities for education.  Ross et al. (2011) conclude that even though education spending is 
generally high in the region, a number of resource-poor countries appear to be doing better. 
Arezki and Nabli (2012) note that while health and education outcomes have significantly im-
proved over the past decades, resource-rich countries have by no means outperformed their 
resource-poor counterparts. The World Bank (2013) further states that health systems in MENA 
countries are not delivering results commensurate with wealth levels and low public financing 
for health compromises access and quality.
The term “resource curse” is well established in the literature and stands for the 
paradox that resource-rich countries seem to experience slower growth compared to their re-
source-poor counterparts (Auty, 1994; Sachs and Warner, 1995). Recently, the resource curse is 
investigated from a broader angle and negative spill-over effects of resource wealth are found, 
not only on economic growth, but also on a broader set of development indicators (Bulte et al., 
Table I: Gross National Income (GNI) and Human Development Index 
(HDI) rankings of MENA countries
GNI per capita rank HDI rank Difference
Algeria* 83 93 -10
Armenia 111 87 24
Azerbaijan* 71 76 -5
Bahrain* 31 44 -13
Cyprus 37 32 5
Djibouti 145 170 -25
Egypt, Arab Rep. 94 110 -16
Iran, Islamic Rep.* 79 75 4
Iraq* 77 120 -43
Israel 34 19 15
Jordan 89 77 12
Kuwait* 3 46 -43
Lebanon 69 65 4
Libya* 50 55 -5
Morocco 115 129 -14
Oman* 18 56 -38
Qatar* 1 31 -30
Saudi Arabia* 12 34 -22
Sudan 143 166 -23
Syrian Arab Republic* 123 118 5
Tunisia 93 90 3
Turkey 60 69 -9
United Arab 
Emirates*
8 40 -32
West Bank and Gaza - - -
Yemen, Rep.* 140 154 -14
Source: UN statistics 2014. 
Note: * Resource-rich MENA countries.
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2005). Carmignani and Avom (2010), for example, find adverse effects of natural resource de-
pendence on social development outcomes. Gylfason and Zoega (2002) and Goderis and Malone 
(2011) discuss the negative association between natural resource wealth and income inequality. 
Moreover, even though in theory, large natural capital endowments provide an opportunity to 
build human capital as the revenues can serve as a new source of finance, several authors sug-
gest that natural capital crowds out human capital (Blanco and Grier, 2012; Cabrales and Hauk, 
2011; Gylfason et al., 1999; Gylfason, 2001; Shao and Yang, 2014). Moreover, Gylfason (2001) 
and Stijns (2006) find that several indicators of natural resource wealth are negatively correlated 
with public education spending and Cockx and Francken (2014) provide robust evidence of an 
adverse association between natural resource wealth and public health spending. 
This paper contributes to the literature by empirically exploring the link between 
natural resource, and more specifically oil wealth, and social spending on health and education 
in MENA. Our findings are in line with the idea that “natural resources may in general hinder the 
process of human capital creation that is the basis of long term growth” (World Bank, 2011). The 
next section briefly discusses the literature on the resource curse in the MENA region. The third 
section depicts the estimation strategy and provides information on the data. The fourth section 
discusses the empirical results. The fifth section investigates the oil curse more specifically, and 
the final section concludes. 
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2. A resource curse in MENA? 
Birdsall and Subramanian (2004) argue that while the oil-rich countries of the Middle 
East have so far escaped some of the worst economic consequences of the resource curse due 
to their ratio of a relatively small population to a vast amount of oil, the relative prosperity could 
significantly deteriorate over time due to a decay of the political and economic institutions as a 
consequence of a fight over oil wealth as illustrated by a country like Venezuela. 
The experiences of oil-rich MENA countries in fact served as an inspiration for the 
theory on “rentier states” (Mahdavy, 1970), which postulates that the availability of “external 
rents” as government revenues affects economic development as well as state formation and 
the quality of institutions. Several authors have illustrated that oil rents have strong explanatory 
power in accounting for weaker governance in the Middle East due to principal-agent problems 
(Karl, 2007; Ross, 2001; Sala-i-Martin and Artadi, 2002; World Bank, 2003). With larger resource 
rents, the incentives to collude (between governments and oil companies), to obscure informa-
tion, to design more complex contracts, and to steer revenues towards special groups will be 
greater (AFD, 2009).
Deriving directly from the rentier state theory, the “rentier effect” has also been 
proposed as the main causal mechanism that might explain the association between oil exports 
and authoritarian rule, a hypothesis that originated from the fact that high-income, resource-
rich states in MENA have not become democratic. The effect has given rise to a substantial lit-
erature (Barro, 1999; Ross, 2001; Tsui, 2011). According to Ross (2001) the rentier effect has 
three components: a taxation, spending and group formation effect. In the presence of large oil 
revenues, governments may be virtually completely autonomous from their society and as such, 
less likely to tax their population (Schwarz, 2008). The public will in turn be hesitant to demand 
accountability and representation. Moreover, oil wealth can be used for greater spending on 
patronage, which is expected to decrease pressure for democratization. With regards to the 
group formation effect in rentier states, Ross (2001) suggests that government oil wealth im-
pedes the formation of social capital and hence blocks the transition to democracy. Ross (2001) 
proposed two additional causal mechanisms; the repression effect and the modernization effect. 
The former entails that oil wealth can be used to finance increased internal safety and thus block 
democratic pressures. Finally, the third explanation starts from the hypothesis that resource-led 
growth doesn’t produce the type of social change that is conducive to democratization; rising 
levels of education and specialization. 
Arezki and Nabli (2012) conclude that resource-rich MENA countries have been 
characterized by relatively low and non-inclusive economic growth and high levels of volatility 
over the past 40 years. Al-Rawashdeh et al. (2013) confirm the existence of an adverse asso-
ciation between dependence on oil and gas exports on GDP per capita growth between 1971 
and 2010 in MENA countries. Moreover, the authors find a significant and positive relationship 
between resource dependence and corruption and a lack of democracy coupled with the need 
for excessive military spending. Apergis and Payne (2014) provide results for the resource-rich 
MENA countries with abundant labour1 that demonstrate uniform support for the oil curse hy-
[1]  Countries in the MENA regions are often subdivided into three groups. The Resource Poor Labor Abundant 
group includes countries that possess less oil resources relative to their overall size, while the population and labor 
force are abundant like Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia. The Resource Rich Labor Abundant 
group covers countries like Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen. And lastly the Resource Rich Labor Importing 
group includes those countries which possess oil resources in abundance, while the population and labor forces are 
scarce such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar 
(World Bank, 2007; Arezki and Nabli, 2012; Apergis and Payne, 2014).
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pothesis over time as the coefficient of oil reserves is negative throughout the period between 
1990 and 2013. For the resource-rich labour importing countries on the other hand, the coef-
ficient is positive beyond 2003. The authors hypothesize that these results may reflect that the 
need to import labor provides additional incentives to create a favorable business climate to the 
international community. 
3. Estimation strategy and data
The debate on the existence of the resource curse has put forward important meth-
odological concerns. Several authors have argued that as the research is prone to omitted vari-
able bias it is paramount to move from cross-country to panel evidence (Manzano and Rigobon, 
2001; Collier and Goderis, 2007; Lederman and Maloney, 2008). We therefore base our analysis 
upon a panel dataset for the period of 1995 to 2009, constructed for the aim of this research. 
In line with Brunschweiler and Bulte (2009), Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010), Bhattacharyya 
and Collier (2013) and Cockx and Francken (2014) we have subdivided the data into three five 
year periods; from 1995 to 1999, from 2000 to 2004 and finally from 2005 to 2009. The use of 
five year averages will allow us to handle annual volatility and measurement errors. Descriptive 
statistics are summarized in Tables II and III.
3.1. Dependent variables
3.1.1. Public Health expenditures
We use the World Bank data on public health expenditures as a percentage of GDP 
(Public Health Expenditures), which are derived from the World Health Organization’s National 
Health Accounts. Public health spending consists of “recurrent and capital spending from gov-
ernment budgets, external borrowings and grants and social health insurance funds” (World 
Bank, 2014). This spending therefore includes spending from development assistance for health 
as well as from domestic resources.
As is reflected in Figure II, even compared to the developing countries’ average, 
MENA countries on average had worryingly low levels of government spending on health care 
during the last 15 years. Government health spending in this region hasn’t reached the 5 per 
cent level, , suggested as an indicator by the WHO (Savedoff, 2007). Moreover, the composition 
of health expenditures has remained relatively constant over time with household out-of-pocket 
spending accounting for nearly half of total health expenditures, indicating that many individu-
als lack financial protection or insurance against illness. Consequently, the financial burden of 
health care is likely to force part of the population into poverty, or forgo health care altogether.
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3.1.2. Public Education expenditures
To capture the government’s commitment to education, we use the World Bank 
data on public spending on education as a percentage of GDP (Public Education Expenditures), 
which are derived from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) who collect information annually 
from official national statistical authorities. Public expenditure on education consists of current 
and capital spending on both public and private education institutions, education administra-
tion and transfers or subsidies. It includes expenditures funded by transfers from international 
sources to the government (UIS, 2014). 
As can be derived from Figure II, the MENA region is characterized by high levels of 
government spending on education. There are however, some concerns about the equity of the 
distribution of education expenditures across different levels of education with a bias towards 
investment in tertiary education (Tansel and Kazemi, 2000). 
Figure III : Public spending on education in MENA
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3.2. Natural resources
There are various explanations as to why natural resource wealth could negatively 
affect public spending on health and education. 
First of all, natural resource revenues have been argued to represent an important 
source of “unearned state income” that entails little organizational and political effort in working 
with citizens and therefore allows for a certain degree of state autonomy and unaccountability. 
This disconnect could decrease the need to gain citizens’ support, which consequently dimin-
ishes incentives to be responsive to citizens’ needs and provide public goods such as health and 
education. Bornhorst et al. (2009) find that large natural resource endowments reduce domestic 
revenue efforts. McGuirk (2013) corroborates these findings and hypothesizes that in the pres-
Figure II : Health expenditures in MENA
Source : World Bank, 2015
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ence of high natural resource rents, leaders lower the burden of taxation in order to reduce 
demand for democratic accountability.  Similarly, Collier (2006) states that lower domestic tax 
effort in resource-rich countries diminishes the incentive for public scrutiny of the government. 
Bellin (2004) notes that access to rentier income from natural resource extraction in MENA coun-
tries has allowed the state to “pay itself first” and prioritize military and security spending while 
education expenditures remain flat. Ross et al. (2011) similarly conclude that throughout history, 
a number of MENA countries have fit this description of “rentier states” and that an abundant 
source of nontax revenues may lead to increased military spending that detracts from resources 
available to other sectors and facilitates repression of the population. Al-Rawashdeh et al. (2013) 
find that almost all Gulf States in fact consistently spend a greater share of their GDP on the 
military than the global average.
Second, Gylfason (2001) argues that natural resource wealth gives rise to a disre-
gard for human capital development and myopic behavior. Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) similar-
ly claim that natural resource wealth creates a false sense of security and weakens the perceived 
need for growth-promoting strategies such as investment in health and education. 
Finally, the large fluctuations in commodity prices render government revenues in 
resource dependent countries highly volatile. Arezki and Nabli (2012) find that over the last 
five decades macroeconomic volatility in resource-rich MENA countries was twice as high as in 
resource-poor countries in the region. Such volatility contributes to poor planning and leads to 
boom and bust in public spending (Lane, 2003; van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009).
We derive our indicator of natural resource dependence from the World Bank da-
tabase on the Changing Wealth of Nations, which comprises a set of “comprehensive wealth” 
accounts, including elaborate estimates for natural capital2, for over 150 countries. In line with 
Cockx and Francken (2014), Cabrales and Hauk (2011), the World Bank (2011) and Gylfason 
(2001) we use the share of natural capital in total national wealth3 (Resource Dependence) to 
take into account a country’s structural reliance on natural resources.
3.3. Additional control variables
We control for the effect of income as it has been argued to be an important posi-
tive determinant of government expenditures. According to Wagner’s law there exists a positive 
association between economic development and government public spending as a percentage 
of GDP over time. Most of the literature on the determinants of health expenditures focus on 
the relationship between income and health care spending (Lago-Peñas et al., 2013; Costa-Font 
et al., 2011; Clemente et al., 2004). Several authors have also established a positive wealth ef-
fect for government spending on education (Busemeyer, 2007; Akanbi and Schoeman, 2010). We 
take into account the effect of income by including the logarithm of World Bank data on GDP per 
capita reported in constant 2005 US Dollar, at the start of every five year period (GDP).
As there is considerable international support focused on mobilizing additional re-
sources for financing health and education, we want to control for the effect of aid. Supplements 
to income can be assumed to relax macroeconomic budget constraints and increase resources 
available for public social spending. Moreover, we hypothesize that as donors stress the impor-
tance of health and education, government priorities may shift. Murthy and Okunade (2009) 
[2]    Natural capital wealth is defined as the sum of wealth, calculated as the net present value over a 25 year time 
horizon for renewable natural resources and over the time to exhaustion for non-renewable resources, stemming 
from crop, pasture land, timber and non-timber forest, protected areas, oil, natural gas, coal and minerals (bauxite, 
copper, lead, nickel, phosphate, tin, zinc, gold, silver and iron ore) (World Bank, 2011).
[3]    Wealth is defined as the present value of future consumption that is sustainable, discounted at a rate of time 
preference of 1.5 percent, over 25 years (World Bank, 2011).
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demonstrate that aid is an important positive determinant of health care expenditures in Africa. 
Another line of thought is related to concerns about fungibility of aid, in which case aid would 
have a depressing effect on domestic spending on health and education. Van de Sijpe (2012) 
however finds that aid in both sectors leads to at most, a small displacement of a recipient’s do-
mestic public spending. To control for the effect of aid, we include five year averages of the OECD/
DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS) data on one year-lagged Official Development Assistance 
commitments as a percentage of GDP (Aid). We assume zero-values for countries for which aid 
flows are not reported in the OECD/DAC database. 
Both health and education spending can easily be argued to be affected by the age 
structure of the population. Traditionally, higher age is associated with more health care utiliza-
tion4 (Yang et al., 2003; Dormont et al., 2006). Moreover, population ageing exerts an influence 
on the political prioritization, which could result in a demand for higher public health spend-
ing (Breyer et al., 2010). In analyses of public expenditure on education, the proportion of the 
population aged 65 and above is commonly added as a control (Besley and Case, 2003; Archibald 
and Feldman, 2006; Grob and Wolter, 2007). It has been hypothesized that the preference for 
education spending diminishes with an ageing population. Another line of arguments however, 
stresses that a rising number of elderly may exert a positive effect on education spending, to the 
extent that the elderly want to seek to raise the training of young workers, so that they gener-
ate a larger pool of resources from which pension and other social transfers can be funded and 
to improve the quality of services they receive (Richman and Stagner, 1986). To control for the 
effect of age distribution on public health and on public education expenditures, we add the 
proportion of the total population aged 65 and above (Pop.>65) to our regression analysis. The 
data are gathered from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) database.  
Finally, we want to control for good governance and the quality of institutions as 
potential determinants of public goods provision. The World Bank (2003) states that account-
ability as a basis of good governance in particular is relevant in the MENA region. Delavallade 
(2006) in turn hypothesizes that unaccountability of political leaders may give rise to opportuni-
ties for public agents to support rent generating sectors to the detriment of the social sectors. 
Similarly, several authors have linked electoral competition to the growth of government social 
spending (Comiskey, 1993; Hecock, 2006; Stasavage, 2005). In line with Delavallade (2006) and 
Cabrales and Hauk (2011), we will take this into account by including the “freedom” indicator 
from Freedom House (Freedom), that is calculated as the mean of the political rights and the civil 
liberties index. According to Freedom House political rights “enable people to participate freely 
in the political process and include the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate 
elections, compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect represent-
atives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate”. Civil 
liberties allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, 
rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state (Freedom House, 2012). 
The freedom indicator varies between one and seven, one representing the most free and seven 
the least free.
[4]   This assumption is not without  dispute. It has been suggested that proximity to death represents the main 
determinant of   health care costs (see for example Seshamani and Gray, 2004).
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In sum, the baseline empirical model is of the following form:
                                𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽4(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸. > 65)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽5(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
where i represents a country, t time,  the country fixed effect and ɛ the error term. To inves-
tigate government health spending, Public Education Expenditure is replaced by Public Health 
Expenditure.
We have restricted our sample only on the basis of data availability for our indica-
tors of choice. While the WHO National Health Account System provides a dataset on public 
health expenditures with relatively few missing values, the data on public education expendi-
tures are considerably less complete. We therefore opted to work with two different samples. 
Descriptive statistics for the health and education expenditure analyses are summarized in Tables 
II and III respectively.
Table II: Descriptive statistics (sample 1)
Obs. Countries Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum
Overall Between Within
Public health expendi-
tures
50 18 2.5525 1.1306 1.1218 0.2777 0.8544 5.2745
Resource Dependence 50 18 30.5598 23.7946 22.8430 8.7083 1.4442 107.0754
Oil Dependence 50 18 15.1707 16.7161 16.0799 5.5862 0 61.2266
GDP 50 18 8.4335 1.3398 1.35089 0.1254 6.1835 10.7357
Aid 50 18 1.6471 2.5863 2.6451 0.8666 0 10.5618
Pop.>65 50 18 4.7189 2.7339 2.9188 0.2566 0.5679 11.2753
Freedom 50 18 4.498 2.01641 2.1189 0.2438 1 7
Source: WHO, World Bank, Freedom House. 
Countries : Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, UAE
Table III: Descriptive statistics (sample 2)
Obs. Countries Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum
Overall Between Within
Public education expendi-
tures
39 17 8.4803 1.2407 1.2859 0.1306 6.7732 10.7206
Resource Dependence 39 17 28.5127 21.8036 21.0108 6.7667 1.4442 76.3709
Oil Dependence 39 17 16.4031 18.0943 16.6625 5.8787 0 61.2266
GDP 39 17 8.4803 1.2407 1.2859 0.1306 6.7732 10.7206
Aid 39 17 1.4497 2.3438 2.5710 0.4654 0 10.5618
Pop.>65 39 17 5.2929 2.79437 2.9603 0.2577 1.0005 11.2753
Freedom 39 17 4.1872 2.0973 2.0584 0.2557 1 7
Source: UIS, World Bank, Freedom House. 
Countries : Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, UAE.
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4. Empirical results
4.1. The impact of natural resource dependence on public spending on health  
 and education
Before proceeding to the results, here are some remarks about the data analysis. 
In line with Murshed (2004), Manzano and Rigobon (2006), Collier and Goderis (2007), Haber 
and Menaldo (2011 Bhattacharyya and Collier (2013) and Cockx and Francken (2014), we have 
opted to include country-specific fixed effects, as these will effectively control for all unobserv-
able time-invariant country characteristics. To address any remaining within-country correlation, 
we use cluster-robust standard deviations. We check for collinearity with the diagnostic tool 
developed by Besley, Kuh and Welsch (1980) and find that the conditioning numbers are well 
below the suggested cut-off value of 30, indicating that there are no problems with collinearity.
The regression results summarized in Table IV confirm the existence of a resource 
curse effect on public health spending in the MENA region. Natural resource dependence, meas-
ured as the share of natural capital in total national wealth, has a significantly negative effect on 
public education expenditures relative to GDP. This adverse effect remains highly significant even 
after controlling for the effects of income, aid, the age structure of the population and freedom. 
According to these estimations, keeping all other factors constant, a ten per cent increase in the 
share of natural capital in total national wealth (Resource Dependence), which corresponds for 
example to the difference between Bahrain (41.45%)  and  Algeria (52.28%) in 2005, is associated 
with an average decrease of public health expenditures of approximately 0.16 per cent of GDP. 
Bearing in mind that the average expenditure on health for this region was only 2.57 per cent of 
GDP during this period, this represents a considerable difference.
The additional controls all have the expected sign. In line with the literature, our re-
sults reaffirm the hypothesized role of income in explaining health spending variation. The coef-
ficient for the logarithm of GDP per capita is highly significant and positive. We find no significant 
effect of the share of ODA in GDP. It has been argued however, that poverty reduction is not the 
Table IV: Results fixed effects regressions on Public Health Expenditures
Res.Dep -0.0141** 
(0.013)
-0.0159*** 
(0.002)
-0.0152** 
(0.022)
-0.0156** 
(0.013)
-0.0158** 
(0.011)
GDP 0.9419*** 
(0.000)
0.9532*** 
(0.000)
0.6672*** 
(0.000)
0.5369** 
(0.020)
Aid 0.0185 
(0.730)
0.0172 
(0.761)
0.0156 
(0.793)
Pop.>65 0.2121 
(0.154)
0.2054 
(0.112)
Freedom -0.2747** 
(0.012)
Obs. 50 50 50 50 50
Countries 18 18 18 18 18
Within R² 0.1958 0.3732 0.3760 0.3973 0.4514
Between R² 0.3282 0.1964 0.1974 0.2244 0.1250
Overall R² 0.3089 0.1799 0.1821 0.2473 0.1640
Notes:  
Res. Dep. stands for Resource Dependence. 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Reported p-values are based on cluster-robust standard errors.
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main motivation for development assistance in this region, rather aid allocation is substantially 
influenced by donors’ domestic political considerations, (Collier and Dollar, 2002; Harrigan et al., 
2006).We further note that the indicator of freedom, is significant at the five per cent level. The 
negative coefficient indicates that a higher score on the seven point indicator, which corresponds 
to poorer performance with regards to civil liberties and political rights, is associated with lower 
public health spending. 
Next, we investigate the effect of natural resource dependence on public education 
spending relative to GDP. Table V summarizes the main regression results.
We find evidence of a strong, statistically significant, negative relationship between 
natural resource dependence and public education spending, indicating the existence of a public 
education spending resource curse in the MENA region. In line with the hypothesis put forward 
by Richman and Stagner (1986), our results further indicate that a larger share of the population 
aged 65 and above is associated with higher public education spending. Perhaps most important 
for the purpose of this paper, controlling for income, aid, age distribution and freedom doesn’t 
alter the significance or the magnitude of the adverse effect of Resource Dependence. According 
to the regression model including all additional controls, keeping all else fixed a ten per cent 
increase in the share of natural capital in total national wealth corresponds to a decrease in 
government spending on education of approximately 0.29 per cent of GDP. While at first sight, 
the effect appears to be large compared to the previously established health spending resource 
curse effect, we note that government spending on education has been particularly high in this 
region, with an average of 8.48 per cent of GDP  for this period.
4.2. Robustness checks
We check whether our results are corroborated in regressions including time fixed 
effects (see Table A1, Appendix). As such, we control for unobserved effects that vary over 
time as well as over countries. We continue to find strong support for the existence of a health 
Table V: Results fixed effects regressions on Public Education 
Expenditures
Res.Dep -0.0302** 
(0.047)
-0.0329** 
(0.029)
-0.0349** 
(0.020)
-0.0288** 
(0.035)
-0.0295** 
(0.040)
GDP 0.4224 
(0.244)
0.9343 
(0.237)
-0.8273 
(0.392)
-0.5038 
(0.633)
Aid 0.1846 
(0.347)
0.0048 
(0.982)
0.0510 
(0.813)
Pop.>65 0.8986** 
(0.040)
0.8466* 
(0.058)
Freedom 0.2134 
(0.358)
Obs. 39 39 39 39 39
Countries 17 17 17 17 17
Within R² 0.1994 0.2123 0.2283 0.3512 0.3632
Between R² 0.0692 0.0230 0.0017 0.0439 0.0635
Overall R² 0.0625 0.0782 0.0373 0.0101 0.0244
Notes:  
Res. Dep. stands for Resource Dependence. 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Reported p-values are based on cluster-robust standard errors.
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spending resource curse, though the coefficient for natural resource dependence has decreased 
slightly in terms of magnitude. The effect of natural resource dependence on public education 
expenditures is not robust to including time fixed effects (see Table A1, Appendix). Further re-
sults however indicate, that the inclusion of time fixed effects is not necessary in both analyses5.
We also want to control for the possibility that government spending depends on 
previous expenditures. We therefore use annual data for all our variables and develop a dynamic 
regression specification where we include the lag of expenditures on health and education re-
spectively as an explanatory variable. To fully capture the dynamic nature of our 15 year panel, 
we are obliged to refrain from using our preferred measure of natural resource dependence, 
the share of natural capital in total wealth, and replace it with a similar indicator; the share of 
natural resource rents6 in GDP. Similar measures have been used by authors such as Atkinson and 
Hamilton (2003), Collier and Hoeffler (2005), de Soysa and Neumayer (2007).
As traditional panel data estimators are no longer consistent, we apply the instru-
mental variables first difference estimator proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1982) in line with 
Lederman and Maloney (2007). Controlling for this dynamic relation doesn’t alter our main re-
sults; the negative coefficient for natural resource dependence remains highly significant in the 
regression on public health expenditures as well as public education spending (see Table A2, 
Appendix). 
[5]   For both regressions, a test on the joint significance of the dummies’ coefficients clearly indicates that the 
hypothesis that the intercept is constant over all periods cannot be rejected.
[6]   Total natural resources rents are the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, 
and forest rents.
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5. Extension : The unfulfilled promise of oil
While the Middle East and North Africa is a resource diverse region, the resource-
rich countries have a particularly unusual abundance of oil. MENA is endowed with more than 
half of total oil reserves and contributed to over 35 per cent of world oil production in 2013 
(BP Statistical Review, 2014). At the same time, oil has been argued to create an extreme case 
of the resource curse. Even relative to other commodities, direct linkages are few and real oil 
prices are exceptionally volatile. According to Karl (2007) other special characteristics include 
its depletability, particularly high capital intensity and technological sophistication, its enclave 
nature and the exceptional generation of profits that accrue to the state and to private actors. 
It has been argued that especially the concentration of the extraction and revenue patterns of 
oil generate a “curse”. Several researchers have in fact indicated that only natural resources that 
are extracted from a narrow geographic zone and generate easily appropriable rents give rise to 
“heightened economic and social divisions and weakened institutional capacity” (Isham et al., 
2005) and breed corruption (Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010). Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 
(2013) similarly conclude that oil in particular has a deleterious impact on institutional quality. 
Schubert (2006) states that oil dependence leads to a skewing of political forces and increases 
rent-seeking behavior. Oil in particular has also been associated with authoritarianism and con-
flict (Ross, 2001; Ross, 2004). Finally, Blanco and Grier (2012) find that only petroleum exports 
appear to have a negative effect on human capital accumulation in Latin-America.
To explore to what extent the reliance on this particular commodity influences gov-
ernment spending on health and education, we repeat our analysis with Oil Dependence rather 
than Resource Dependence as our main variable of interest. Again we measure dependence by 
looking at the share of oil wealth in total national wealth.
Table VI summarizes our main results for public health expenditures. We find that 
after controlling for income, aid, age structure of the population and freedom, the effect of oil 
dependence is highly significant and has a considerably larger impact on public health expendi-
tures. Compared to the previously established effect of natural resource dependence as a whole, 
Table VI: Results fixed effects regressions on Public Health Expenditures
Oil. Dep. -0.0067 
(0.568)
-0.0229** 
(0.021)
-0.0266*** 
(0.004)
-0.0267*** 
(0.005)
-0.0264*** 
(0.002)
GDP 1.3408*** 
(0.000)
1.5346*** 
(0.000)
1.5555*** 
(0.000)
1.4256*** 
(0.000)
Aid 0.1069* 
(0.087)
0.1070* 
(0.088)
0.1060 
(0.111)
Pop.>65 -0.0127 
(0.923)
-0.0170 
(0.896)
Freedom -0.2476** 
(0.039)
Obs. 50 50 50 50 50
Countries 18 18 18 18 18
Within R² 0.0180 0.2781 0.3832 0.3832 0.4272
Between R² 0.0955 0.1648 0.1886 0.1853 0.1655
Overall R² 0.0780 0.1437 0.1735 0.1693 0.1671
Notes:  
Oil Dep. stands for Oil Dependence. 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Reported p-values are based on cluster-robust standard errors.
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the coefficient is nearly twice as large in terms of magnitude. Keeping all else equal, a ten per 
cent increase in the share of oil wealth in total national wealth, which corresponds roughly to 
the difference between the United Arab Emirates (26.35 %) and Oman (36.31 %) in 2005, is as-
sociated with a decrease of public health spending of approximately 0.26 per cent of GDP. Other 
coefficients also seem to be plausibly estimated and are similar to what we found before.
Similar to what we found for public health spending, the results of the regression 
on public education expenditures summarized in Table VII, show strong support for the existence 
of an oil curse on public education expenditures. The coefficient for oil dependence is highly sig-
nificant in all the regression specifications and is considerably larger compared to the previously 
established effect of natural resource dependence as a whole. According to these estimates, 
keeping all else fixed a ten per cent increase in the share of oil wealth in total national wealth 
is on average associated with a decline in government spending on education of approximately 
0.36 % of GDP.
Table VII : Results fixed effects regressions on Public Education Expenditures
Oil. Dep. -0.0338** 
(0.019)
-0.0436*** 
(0.001)
-0.0451*** 
(0.001)
-0.0348*** 
(0.010)
-0.0361** 
(0.016)
GDP 0.8544* 
(0.083)
1.2825 
(0.157)
-0.4191 
(0.709)
-0.0510 
(0.967)
Aid 0.1518 
(0.496)
-0.0095 
(0.969)
0.0402 
(0.872)
Pop.>65 0.7898* 
(0.083)
0.7288 
(0.106)
Freedom 0.2252 
(0.353)
Obs. 39 39 39 39 39
Countries 17 17 17 17 17
Within R² 0.1892 0.2329 0.2439 0.3316 0.3450
Between R² 0.0374 0.0012 0.0006 0.0376 0.0585
Overall R² 0.0163 0.0457 0.0259 0.0100 0.0289
Notes:  
Oil Dep. stands for Oil Dependence. 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Reported p-values are based on cluster-robust standard errors.
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6. Conclusion
This paper contributes to the ‘resource curse’ literature by empirically investigat-
ing how vast natural resource endowments affect government priorities and in particular public 
spending on human development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Using a 
panel dataset covering the period from 1995 to 2009, we find a robust, significant inverse re-
lationship between natural resource dependence and public health spending on the one hand, 
and natural resource dependence and public education spending, on the other hand. The effects 
remain significant after controlling for income, aid, the age structure of the population, and the 
quality of institutions. Furthermore, our findings indicate that increased reliance on oil wealth in 
particular, gives rise to this resource curse effect of reduced government prioritization of social 
spending in MENA countries.
The robust and strong adverse association between natural resource and oil de-
pendence and public health expenditures is especially worrying given the already exceptionally 
low average levels of government health spending in this region. While the regional average for 
public education expenditures on the other hand is relatively high, the finding that natural re-
source dependence is associated with lower government education spending remains cause for 
concern especially since Tansel and Kazemi (2003) find that oil-rich MENA countries also tend to 
have higher inequity in the distribution of resources among different education levels. 
Moreover, MENA‘s economic development models are under significant pressure 
due to a strong population growth and the need for diversification. However, for sustainable 
pro-poor growth to occur, adequate investment in health and education are paramount . Correct 
taxation of natural resource, and especially, oil wealth should provide the governments with 
adequate budgets to fund a desirable level of public health provision.  
The establishment of the existence of a resource and oil curse effect on government 
social spending in MENA is in line with the rentier state theory and points to the importance of 
government accountability. We note however , that governments in MENA countries appear 
to be particularly reluctant to increase transparency and accountability about natural resource 
revenues, as only 2 countries in the region currently adhere to the EITI Standard. Governments 
should be strongly encouraged to manage their natural wealth in an accountable and equitable 
manner that follows international best practice and which promotes sustainable growth in the 
long run.
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 Appendix
Table A1: Results fixed effects regression Public Health and Education 
Expenditures  
(including time fixed effect)
Public Health Exp. Public Edu. Exp.
Res.Dep -0.0153** 
(0.011)
-0.0261 
(0.115)
GDP 0.6428* 
(0.074)
0.8360 
(0.557)
Aid 0.0247 
(0.691)
0.1556 
(0.510)
Pop.>65 0.2708 
(0.037)
0.5613 
(0.342)
Freedom -0.2493* 
(0.056)
0.0052 
(0.969)
Time fixed effects
2000-2004 -0.0926 
(0.470)
0.3133 
(0.386)
2005-2009 -0.0990 
(0.551)
-0.2076 
(0.718)
Obs. 50 39
Countries 18 17
Within R² 0.4656 0.4765
Between R² 0.1290 0.0218
Overall R² 0.1680 0.0357
Notes: 
Res Dep. stands for Resource Dependence. 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Reported p-values are based on cluster-robust standard errors.
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Table A2: Results IV regression Public Health and Education Expenditures 
Public Health Exp. Public Edu.Exp.
Public Health Expenditures 
t-1
-1.2430* 
(0.089)
Public Education Expenditures 
t-1
0.6988 
(0.186)
Res.Dep -0.0146*** 
(0.007)
-0.0454*** 
(0.002)
GDP -1.3696* 
(0.064)
0.0469 
(0.981)
Aid -0.0122 
(0.316)
-0.0042 
(0.941)
Pop.>65 0.2392 
(0.502)
0.2322 
(0.779)
Freedom 0.0793 
(0.560)
 0.2206 
(0.417)
Obs. 270 93
Countries 24 15
Within R² 0.2370 0.2495
Between R² 0.7285 0.8189
Overall R² 0.2978 0.5636
Notes: 
Public Health Exp., Public Edu.Exp. and Res.Dep. stand for Public Health Expenditures,  
Public Education Expenditures and Resource Dependence respectively 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Reported p-values are based on cluster-robust standard errors.
 
